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Introduction
The concept of the "modern presidency" is the anchoring paradigm of presidential studies today. In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt first described the attributes of the modern presidency, and Fred Greenstein later codified the The Constitution states in Article II that "the executive power shall be vested in a President," but nowhere is the executive power explicitly defined. The ambiguity of executive power stands in sharp contrast to the specificity of the legislative powers enumerated in Article I-"All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress" (emphasis added). These constitutional "silences" regarding executive power grant presidents the right-indeed, they compel presidents-to define executive power according to circumstance, to seek authority according to necessity, and to claim legitimacy for political actions where there is no doctrinal warrant.'2 Although the debate over why the Founders institutionalized the ambiguity of executive power is an interesting one, the important point here is that the presidency, unlike the Congress, must work to achieve the authority it is not explicitly granted.
The president cannot merely declare his authority and make it so: as Machiavelli observed, executive power must be negotiated, justified, and achieved. As political actors operating within a political system inhabited by other institutions vying for power and authority, presidents must ensure their institutional rights, per se, in relation to other institutions of governance. They must carve out specific realms of governance in which their actions will be considered legitimate and authoritative. Like Machiavelli's prince, they yearn for autonomy; but unlike the prince, their authority must be derived from the democratic political system in which they operate. By actively confronting existing institutional arrangements, redefining political understandings, and seizing upon any number of available resources, presidents throughout history have actively crafted their personal, political, and institutional authority.
Institutional Incentives of the American Presidency
Even when constitutionalized and republicanized in the form we recognize as the American presidency, the ambiguity of executive power creates an incentive for presidents to be dynamic and forceful agents of change as they interact with other political institutions. As political actors, presidents are fundamentally concerned with the politics of governing, and they seek to achieve their political purposes through political means. Among other goals, presidents seek reelection, the perception of leadership success, historical greatness, and a strengthened party by asserting their authority and by trying to control political developments on their own terms.
Moe advances an understanding of the president's institutional incentives that is quite similar to ours: presidents attempt to achieve their goals by appearing strong and by working to expand their institutional autonomy. ' good president."14 To achieve this autonomy, presidents take "aggressive action within their own sphere of authority to shift the structure of politics for themselves and everyone else."l5 They engage with the institutional system strategically and forcefully, hoping to achieve their political objectives and enhance their independent authority.
Moe recognizes that presidents are motivated by a "quest for control" and autonomy. But like many presidency scholars, he mistakenly claims that this quest began with the growth of the bureaucracy and the dramatic rise in expectations for presidential leadership that followed from Franklin Roosevelt's activist presidency. Modern presidents, Moe says, respond to these unreasonable expectations by trying to shape the structure of the political bureaucracy to be more responsive to their personal control. They aggressively build administrative and regulatory institutions that are more tractable, pose challenges to the structure of the congressional bureaucracy, and act unilaterally whenever possible. By "centralizing" the policymaking process in the White House and "politicizing" the institutional system, presidents gain more personal autonomy and institutional authority. 16 It is our contention that the institutional incentives that lead presidents to centralize and politicize result not merely from their pivotal role in determining the structure of the modern bureaucracy, but more fundamentally from the ambiguity of executive power and the elusiveness of authority that is inherent in the office itself. Moe makes a strong case that aggressive administrative and bureaucratic management is the most prominent manifestation of this incentive in the modern period. But because the structural politics of the modern period drive his definition of institutional incentives, Moe's analysis misses the creative ways in which presidents have pursued authority over time. We contend that the president's motivation to politicize and centralize is not a modern phenomenon, but a reaction to a pervasive institutional incentive.
In the following case studies, we examine how Tyler, Polk, and Hayes each sought to seize upon the ambiguity of presidential power to politicize his administration and centralize his authority. John Tyler battled against overzealous Whigs in Congress to secure his institutional independence and advance his signature policy, the annexation of Texas. Through his unprecedented assertion of control over the budgetary process, James Polk created new avenues of bureaucratic authority for the presidency and provided his administration with the necessary means to accomplish his ambitious Jacksonian agenda. By displacing entrenched interests and eliminating political patronage, Rutherford B. Hayes placed the presidency at the center of his party's organization. The following three case studies demonstrate that even lesser-noted nineteenth-century presidents had the incentive to seek political authority not explicitly granted to them by the Constitution and turn it toward their own political purposes.'7 I. Politicizing and Centralizing Administrative Capacity:
The Presidency of John Tyler
The presidency of John Tyler does not stand out in history as particularly remarkable. Nor should it: by most measures, Tyler had modest policy ambitions, he did not lead the nation through any wars or major economic crises, and his personality was not especially noteworthy. He established the important precedent of vice presidential succession, but did not leave a significant political legacy after he left office in 1845. Yet because his presidency did not make much of a mark on American politics, it is all the more illustrative of the presidential incentive to establish independence and political authority by playing upon the ambiguities of executive power in the Constitution. Like modern presidents, Tyler sought to pursue his policy objectives-the annexation of Texas and moderate economic policies that respected states' rights-by politicizing and centralizing his administration.
Tyler did not come to power with an abundance of independent personal or political authority, and as the first Vice President to succeed a deceased president, Tyler could claim no electoral mandate. Tyler's accession to the presidency was hotly contested, and his legitimacy was challenged from all sides. Throughout his term, Tyler's policy objectives failed to generate a popular consensus, and both the Democratic party and the Whig party found that organizing in opposition to Tyler was more fruitful than looking to him for leadership. From the start, Tyler had to seize upon the ambiguities of executive power to create his own sphere of authority.
Securing Formal Authority
With the election of William Henry Harrison to the presidency in 1840, the Whig party hoped to reverse the course of presidential aggrandizement set by Andrew Jack-17. A brief note on our methodology: this research is part of a larger ongoing project critiquing the pervasive "modern/traditional" divide in presidential scholarship by investigating the executive leadership of nineteenth-century presidents. Clearly, these three case studies are not exhaustive; yet they are still informative. To gain the most explanatory power from our limited number of cases, we follow King, Keohane, and Verba by emphasizing the larger number of observations of presidential actions contained within each of the three cases. For example, within the examination of Tyler, our thesis is substantiated by numerous observations, including Tyler's strategic use of the presidential oath, his wresting of control over Harrison's cabinet, his creation of a politicized "kitchen cabinet," his use of the veto, his strategic use of the appointment power, and his efforts to build a new party for political leverage. See Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
son and return congressional supremacy to the federal goverment. In his inaugural address, Harrison promised to put into practice the Whig's restrictive understanding of executive power. Overjoyed congressional Whigs expected their program to be fully implemented without significant interference from the executive branch. But Harrison's untimely death a month later left to his successor the responsibility of living up to the Whig creed. John Tyler, however, had been nominated as the Whig party's vice presidential candidate for political reasons, not for his dedication to the Whig party program. He had provided valuable support to key Whig party leaders in the recent past, and was a states' rights southerner who brought sectional balance to the party coalition. Tyler was a Democrat until the mid-1830s, and only left the party to demonstrate his opposition to Jackson's "war" on the national bank. In placing him on the ticket, the Whig party had "asked him no questions about his views and required him to make no pledges."'8 Tyler was an independent politician who stood, unlike most of his contemporaries, above party politics; his election as a Whig Vice President did not alter his commitment to patrician ideals of independent statesmanship.
Harrison Tyler also decided to deliver an inaugural address, which he considered "a brief exposition of the principles which will govern me in the general course of my administration."21 Using the first person rhetorically was a direct claim of his autonomy as president, and it did not go unnoticed in the press or in the House of Representatives, where a motion was made to force the title upon Tyler of "Vice-President, now exercising the duties of President" (the motion failed). Had Tyler hesitated for another day, week, or month to assert his authority as President, it is reasonable to assume that his congressional detractors would have seized the opportunity to subordinate the presidency and its powers to the will of the Whig majority in Congress. With the question of his legitimacy as president addressed for the moment, if only by his de facto assumption of the title and office, Tyler began his quest to exert control over his administration and to direct political developments on his own terms.
Tyler's Politicization and Centralization
One of the most obvious places for a president to exert his authority as political leader is in his own administration: presidents often seek to shape administrative arrangements in the executive branch and influence the political orientation of governing institutions within their reach. Terry Moe argues that presidents are driven to interact with the surrounding institutional environment by the "underlying degree of congruence" between their incentives and resources and the "existing structures making up the institutional presidency.... If presidents are dissatisfied with the institutional arrangements they inherit, then they will initiate changes to the extent that they have the resources to do so. 
II. Controlling Federal Expenditures to Create Authority: The Presidency of James K. Polk
Presidential scholars widely recognize James Polk's expansive use of executive power as commander-in-chief during the Mexican War. The credit he has received for his aggressive foreign policymaking has overshadowed his distinction as the first president to exercise bureaucratic control over federal expenditures. However, these two impressive expansions of executive power should be considered jointly. In an effort to achieve his policy preferences, Polk politicized and centralized the nascent budget process.
Much like our current president George W. Bush, Polk faced difficult decisions regarding expenditures and wartime spending. As a Jacksonian, Polk needed to follow through on his promise to cut the tariff. But a reduction in revenue generated by the tariff posed a policy conundrum for Polk. To finance the war with Mexico and retain his tariff reduction, Polk needed to gain tight control over federal expenditures. Polk's politicization of the early budget process resulted directly from his pursuit of an ideological policy program.
Polk's innovations in executive branch procedures created new authority for the presidency where none had previously existed, and allowed him to exercise influence without revealing himself in a dramatic display of "sensational execution."39 Unlike Tyler, Polk's legitimacy as president was never questioned. Instead, Polk was an innovator who sought new ways of exercising independence and control in the executive branch in order to pursue his policy agenda. An examination of his efforts to control expenditures demonstrates how a "pre-modern" president politicized and centralized effectively.
Seizing Control of Expenditures
Every year, the various bureaus and offices within each department of the executive branch generated their annual estimates. Before sending their budget esti-39. According to Mansfield, Machiavelli's executive government "is not ordinarily visible" (140). The sometimes "invisible" nature of executive power contributes to its ambiguity. While impressive actions which "jolt men into recalling" why they need government are important, the everyday actions of the prince are just as important for the accumulation of power. In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt substantiates this observation when he argues that presidents must try to exercise continuous leadership rather than leadership at times of extreme crisis (6-9). fell under the President's direct supervision. Although Moe contends that only twentieth-century presidents "anticipate, program, and engineer" the behavior of their bureaucratic subordinates in order to exert their own influence, Polk's fiscal control suggests otherwise.58 Polk's innovations demonstrate that the tendency for presidents to politicize and centralize cannot be attributed only to the existence of a modern bureaucracy, but also to a persistent incentive that encourages presidents to carve out their own spheres of activity. In sum, Polk was largely successful in controlling expenditures. Near the end of his term, he repurchased a half-million dollars in government bonds, thus reducing the national debt significantly before leaving office.59 It would be impossible today for presidents to exercise the same degree of personal control over the executive branch that Polk enjoyed during his term. However, it is clear that presidents in the pre-modern era manipulated the bureaucracy to enact their policy preferences. The president's role in the formation of fiscal policy is undefined in the Constitution, and Polk capitalized upon this imprecision. He interjected the presidency into an area of domestic decision-making that the Treasury secretary and the House Ways and Means committee had dominated during earlier administrations. Because Polk assumed control of the budget through the channels of administrative supervision, his monopolization of the process was accepted "without fanfare."60 He used the loosely knit bureaucratic structure to his advantage and then exerted his independent influence, which ultimately resulted in the execution of the policies he favored. Much like a "modern" president, Polk conceived of the presidency as the driving force in American politics, and forged ahead with an executive determination to disturb, control, and manipulate the political system surrounding him.
III. Politicizing Civil Service Reform:
The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes
One characteristic of "modern" presidential leadership is its increasing independence from party control. As Tulis, Kernell, and Milkis have shown, contemporary presidents speak in their own voices and rely less on partisan apparatuses to establish credible leadership.61 The conventional wisdom is that nineteenth-century parties created presidents, whereas "modern" presidents create their own independent organizations that perform the functions of both campaigning and governance. This examination of Rutherford B. Hayes suggests that the historical relationship between presidents and parties is more complicated. Even when 
IV. Concluding Thoughts: Politicization, Centralization, and the Modern Presidency Construct
The politicized presidencies of John Tyler, James Polk, and Rutherford B. Hayes demonstrate that the constitutional ambiguity of executive power provided a similar incentive structure to three nineteenth-century presidents. Although the presidents in our case studies pursued their political objectives in different ways, the thread that binds them together is their common impulse to push the envelope of executive power and their manipulation of structural arrangements to pursue their policy program. As these cases demonstrate, the tendency for presidents to seek control, authority, and autonomy is not only a modem phenomenon, as typically characterized.88
Even in the absence of the modern executive establishment, we observe that presidents across time are motivated by the ambiguity of executive power to carve out a sphere of independent authority and exercise control over their administrations. Tyler, Polk, and Hayes are a mere sampling of pre-modern presidents whose terms were characterized by politicization and centralization; we anticipate that additional examinations of presidential leadership in different historical eras and political contexts will yield even greater explanatory power. Studies of other lesser-noted presidents, such as Van Buren, Buchanan, Grant, Benjamin Harrison, and Taft, for example, should be highly informative.89 Not all presidents, of course, have been equally aggressive in their quests for authority and autonomy. Some have stood out in American history as bold, assertive presidents, and others have faded into obscurity. Yet all have faced the same institutional incentives provided by the Constitution, which set out the "genetic code" of the presidency.90 The point we wish to underscore is that presidential scholarship narrowly focused on the modern era tends to ignore fundamental, enduring aspects of the president's incentive structure.
Clearly, what we want to know about the presidency should guide how we study it. Much of the scholarship on the modern presidency does well to concentrate on the similarities among modern presidents, particularly when the object is to better understand the president's role as leader of a global power since World War II, or as policymaker and agenda-setter in the same period.91 However, theorydriven analyses of the presidency would benefit, we suggest, from sidestepping the modern presidency construct. For example, Moe's theory of the presidency skillfully identifies the logic of institutional development as consisting of the interplay among incentives, resources, and structures, but it ignores the most significant source of presidential incentives-the Constitution-and 130 years of emergent resources and evolving structures. Because it neglects the "pre-modern" era of presidential politics, Moe's analysis is not able to appreciate the full significance of the institutional incentives embedded in the constitutional presidency. As our brief studies of Tyler, Polk, and Hayes confirm, the tendency for presidents to politicize and centralize is as observable in the "pre-modern" era as it is in the "modern" era. The modern executive establishment does not create the incentive to politicize and centralize: that incentive is found in the Constitution. Why, then, should theories of the presidency be circumscribed by a historical break point which is considered by some-but not others 92-to be the beginning of "modernity" in the presidency? It is time to revisit the utility of the modern presidency construct. While we can still benefit from a deeper appreciation of the changes in the presidency which have taken place since Franklin Roosevelt, the notion of "modernity" in the presidency needs to be more clearly articulated: what do we mean when we talk about the modern presidency? Are we referring to the administrative and bureaucratic growth in the executive branch since the 1930s? Or new foreign policy responsibilities? Or are we concerned with fundamental changes in the way the presidency relates to other institutions, derives and exercises its power, and impacts political developments in the modern era? The significance of "modernity" in the presidency depends on whether we view the presidency as an institution with certain properties, characteristics, and propensities that impact presidents' motives, behaviors, and purposes; or whether we see the presidency as a historically contingent political institution that has transformed itself periodically into different animals, with each break-point marking the end of one era and the beginning of another, each incarnation looking less and less like its previous self. Yet it is not methodologically sound to accept either characterization of the presidency without testing our assumptions, defining our terms, and scrutinizing the temporal boundaries we have chosen to erect.
We contend that understanding the motives and purposes of the presidency and the people who hold the office-indeed, understanding leadership in Americarequires attention to those institutional incentives, resources, and structures which persist across time as well as those which are emergent or period-based. Examining persistent institutional factors without considering emergent ones is as much of a mistake as it is to draw temporal boundaries around the analysis without considering continuities across periods. here is to take account of a single pervasive institutional incentive and take a first
